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Donald R. Griffin, professor of 
animal behavior at The Rockefeller 
University, evaluates new multidisci­
plinary research that has renewed 
interest in the question of animal cog­
nition and consciousness. His revised 
and expanded edition of The Question 
of Animal Awareness is an impressive 
scientific and philosophical critique of 
theories concern ing man's qualitative 
uniqueness. Griffin has expanded his 
philosophical analysis of what it is to 
have mental experiences and has elab­
orated on his criticisms of behaviorism 
and positivism in light of new scien­
tific studies concerning the ways in 
which certain birds, mammals and 
insects communicate. He also elabo­
rates on his general theme that 
experimental participatory communica­
tion might provide us with a "window" 
through which we can learn what ani­
mals are thinking about. Griffin's 
work is characterized by a rigorous 
scientific approach to problems of 
determining the extent to which non­
human animals may be self-conscious. 
He points out that in order to be con­
vincing the data gathered should "be 
validated by replication, independent 
verification, and all the pertinent 
controls customary in experimental 
science. " 
Dogmatic assumptions to the effect 
that animals cannot be self-conscious 
a re often based on the claim that 
mentalistic terms are not susceptible 
to precise definition and are useless 
for scientific analysis. Since Griffin 
is optimistic about gathering scientifi­
cally verifiable data about mental 
images, intentions, and awa reness in 
nonhuman animals, he is obviously 
troubled by this type of objection. 
He correctly notes that almost any 
concept can be quibbled to death by 
excessive insistence on exact opera­
tional definitions. Rather than 
engaging in pointless definitional dis­
putes, Griffin employs model con­
struction or analogical reasoning to 
determine mental experience. In call­
ing certain events "mental" philoso­
phers usually mean that they are pri­
vate or di rectly known by one person 
on Iy. Griffi n notes that if ta ken too 
literally this precludes all knowledge 
of human mental experience other than 
that of oneself. He refuses to waste 
effort replying to this type of scepti­
cism. Since indirect knowledge con­
cerning the mental experience of other 
people is generally considered reliable 
and significant, the question is to 
what extent we can apply this reason­
ing to other species. 
Griffin contends that we can make 
at least limited use of analogies when 
it comes to nonhumans, although we 
must do so cautiously. Mental experi­
ences are said to include the follow­
ing: images, feelings, desires, 
hopes, fears, sensations such as pain, 
hunger, rage, affection, and thinking 
about objects and 
remote in time and 
beliefs concerning 
Mental images need 
they may include a 
events that are 
space as well as 
future events. 
not be visual; 
pattern of remem­
bered or imagined sounds, smells, or 
tactile perceptions. Griffin finds no 
difficulty in attributing beliefs about 
the future to animals. A hungry 
wolf, he says, may believe, for exam­
ple, "If I chase that deer, I can catch 
it, and it will taste good." Objections 
to this type of theorizing are count­
ered by citing numerous empirical 
studies. In addition, he points out 
that animals are used as surrogates or 
models for behavioral investigations on 
the implicit assumption that principles 
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discovered in this way are applicable 
to humans. According to Griffin, this 
assumption implies qualitative continu­
ity, and not difference in kind, 
between humans and other species. 
He also notes that to the extent that 
"basic properties of neu rons, 
synapses, and neuroendocrine mecha­
nisms are similar, we might expect to 
find comparably similar mental experi­
ences. It is well known that basic 
neurophysiological functions are very 
similar indeed in all multicellular ani­
mals. On this basis, we might be 
justified in turning the original argu­
ment of the strict behaviorists com­
pletely upside down. Because neu 1'0­
physiological mechanisms appear to be 
very similar in men and bees, the 
mental experiences resulting from 
their operation must, according to this 
line of reasoning, be equally similar." 
(p. 127) 
In spite of any such similarities 
~oncerning awareness, many behav­
ioral scientists contend that self-a­
wareness is unique to humans. Grif­
fin finds this a desperate attempt 
which is prevalent among many philos­
ophers,especially cartesians, to pre­
.serve man's superiority. Fi rst, ani­
mals a re not conscious. When 
evidence indicates the contrary, the 
claim is that they are not self-con­
scious. However, says Griffin, this 
"is one of a very few areas of cogni­
tive ethology that have al ready been 
illuminated by objective, verifiable 
experiments." He d rawson recent 
research to support the claim that at 
least some an imals are self-conscious. 
.The experiments performed by Gallup, 
for example, show that chimpanzees 
and other Great Apes display an 
intense interest in their own mirror 
images. Since they have learned to 
use mirrors to examine parts of their 
bodies which they cannot see di rectly, 
Griffin suggests that they recognize 
the mi 1'1'01' image as a· representation 
of the self. 
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For the most part,· linguists and 
philosophers have agreed with the 
cartesian claim that language puts a 
perfect distinction between man and 
animal, that it establishes a clear dif­
ference in kind, not degree. In light 
of studies concerning the communica­
tion of bees, bats, and chimpanzees, 
Griffin considers this claim to be un­
supported and dogmatic. Experiments 
indicate that vervet monkey alarm 
calls share an important property with 
human language, namely reference to 
external objects and events. Fu rther, 
it is argued by many scholars that if 
animals use symbols, we must assume 
that they have mental experiences 
similar to humans. Griffin's work 
indicates that bee dances are highly 
complex and definitely symbolic. Most 
animal communication systems that he 
has studied exhibit a degree of com­
plexity that is analogous to human 
linguistic exhange. 
Griffi n p resents a n extended criti­
que of Chomsky's view that the 
capacity for learning and using lan­
guage is a species-specific human 
characteristic. According to Chom­
sky, each "known animal communica­
tion system either consists of a fixed 
number of signals, each associated 
with a specific range of eliciting con­
ditions or internal states, or a· fixed 
number of 'linguistic dimensions,' each 
associated with a non-linguistic dimen­
sion." Griffin does not find empirical 
evidence for this contention. He 
points out that it is difficult to deter­
mine whether the communication 
behavior of any particular animal con­
sists of an absolutely fixed number of 
signals or to establish just what eli­
citing conditions or internal states are 
associated with each. It is quite pos­
sible, he says, "that the perceived 
rigidity and limitation to a few specific 
conditions or states exists in the 
minds of human commentators rather 
than in the world of animal behavior." 
(p.76) His research indicates that 
contrary to Chomsky's opinion, animal 
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behavior and communication is adapta­
ble to new situations and is even 
creative under some ci rcumstances. 
Chomsky would obviously object to 
Griffin's suggestion of participatory 
investigation of animal communication. 
Griffin believes that we may be able 
to determine what animals are thinking 
about by a process of impersonation. 
The approach, he says, "would be 
di rect 'impersonation' of a similar 
species, such as a chimpanzee, by an 
adequately disguised experimenter 
using the gestures and sounds char­
acteristic of chimpanzee communica­
tion." (p. 157) 
Griffin admits that the arguments 
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presented in his book are not conclu­
sive, that they are offered as hypoth­
eses and not as fixed or dogmatic 
assertions immune from challenge or 
experimental testing.. We are, he 
points out, quite ignorant concerning 
the mental experience of animals. 
However, "open-minded agnosticism is 
clearly a necessary first step" in 
developing an experimental science of 
cognitive ethology. Scholars will find 
this work a fair assessment of cu rrent 
research. It is certainly a lively fact 
filled text which. presents challenging 
philosophical and scientific arguments 
for the evolutionary continuity of 
mental experience. 
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